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Abstract: This paper specifically deals with the different policies and technical 
frameworks at a Regional Internet Registry (RIR) level in terms of anti-spam 
measures. It also exposes the issue of spam from an Internet registry perspective, as 
an important element of the Internet technical infrastructure. We found out that, an 
RIR itself is not mandated to fight spam but it maintains a registry that is of 
paramount importance for traceability of Internet Number Resources ownership 
information. The paper starts with describing the challenges faced by operators 
followed by the different sources of spam. It then exposes the different mechanisms 
deployed by RIRs but importantly, this paper shows how those mechanisms either 
technical or policy-oriented are mostly underutilised, although they are operational. 
The latter is achieved by taking AFRINIC, the African RIR as case study. 
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1. Objectives 
The objectives of this paper are: 
 Give the reader an overview of the different sources of spams 
 Explain the importance of a Regional Internet Registry (RIR) as a provider of Internet-
critical information and custodian of data. 
 Expose the different mechanisms with regards to Internet number resources policy 
framework and other technical means available. 
 Provide statistics about usage of those mechanisms by taking as case study the 
AFRINIC WHOIS database. 
2. Introduction 
The concept of 'spam' on the Internet is virtually known to every Internet user. The fight 
against spam is actually a worldwide issue as it has a negative effect on the Internet causing 
both technical and operational problems to network operators and users. It is therefore a 
nuisance and is also regularly used in criminal activities such as phishing and other types of 
fraud. Spamming started back in the days where email actually started and it initially took 
the form of chain letters [31]. Spamming techniques and medium have greatly evolved with 
the advent of cloud-based email and social media platforms. A study from Symantec on the 
state of spam shows that spam made up of more that 92% of all email messages [1]. This 
goes to show the severity of the issue. 
This is why, after so many years, the fight against spam still remains a topic of great 
interest for both the technical community and policy-makers. Many stakeholders in the 
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digital sphere have pulled hands together and came with joint-effort to fight spam, name 
ITU and ISOC [21]. The private sector also came up with the M3AAWG (Messaging 
Malware Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group) [25]. The aim of this Working Group is to 
focus on operational issues of Internet abuse to fight botnets, malware, spam, viruses, DoS 
attacks through technology, industry collaboration and public policy. 
2.1 – What is an RIR? 
As a registry of Internet resources, an RIR operates at the network layer of the OSI model 
or more commonly at the Internet layer of the TCP/IP model. By virtue of its function, 
which is the allocation of Internet resources (IP addresses and AS number) at regional 
levels, RIRs have a direct link to operators at the network-level, which are the LIRs (Local 
Internet Registries) or End-users [34]. They all operate a network and can therefore 
potentially be a source of spam, as well as, victim of spammers. 
2.2 – Defining a Spam 
The exact definition of spam is something that has been subject to endless debates on many 
forums. Some feel that the implicit right to freedom of speech allows them to send any 
mails they wish. This however must be weighed up against the rights of the recipients. 
RFC2635 defines Spam as "transmission of bulk unsolicited emails"[2]. 
The definition of spam should largely be considered from the point of view of the 
recipient. Any mail that a recipient does not wish to receive can in many cases be 
considered as spam but there are some generally accepted characteristics of spam: 
 Bulk volumes of messages sent to thousands of users who have never requested to be 
sent them. 
 Messages that raise security concerns: Mail Bombing, Viruses, Phishing, Scams, ID 
Theft. 
 Messages that negatively affect the operation of the networks in the methods that they 
are delivered. 
 Mostly consisting of commercial, offensive or harmful content 
 Sending of messages that are difficult to trace back to a sender 
2.3 Challenges for Network Service Providers 
Most of the challenges that service providers face with regards to spam are the same around 
the world. Security concerns, bandwidth consumption, overloading of computing resources, 
dissatisfied customers are all problems that are affecting networks across the globe [32]. 
Resource-constrained networks do sometimes feel the effect of these more strongly due to 
the bandwidth, computing and financial resource constraints on the continent and thus there 
is a requirement to be somewhat more careful with the approach to dealing with spam [33]. 
3. Sources of Spam 
There is a wide variety of spamming techniques ranging from botnets using infected 
computers, the exploitation of unsecured networks, spamming through social network 
platforms or exploiting open relays and proxies [19]. In this section we will provide some 
information on two specific spamming sources, which more or less relate to the function of 
a Regional Internet Registry. 
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Table 1: Some Sources of Spam 
Spam Source Description 
Botnets and Zombies It is believed that the majority of the spam today comes from botnets or 
infected computers connected to the Internet. Those could be either servers 
at the operator level but importantly, they are typically computers found in 
home networks. Examples of botnets are Bobax, Grum or Pushdo [3]. The 
fact that they are usually located within the ISP’s customer subnets, RIRs 
are usually used as an important source of information for abuse contact. 
Direct spamming "419 scam" One example of direct spamming is scam. Africa is well known for the “419 
Scam” also called the “Nigerian Scam”, where you receive an email saying 
that you won a lottery or you inherited a massive amount of money [4]. 
They usually request an up-front payment before releasing the sum. “419 
Scams” not only use spoofed email addresses but make use of phishing 
techniques to lure people to fake website that would collect credit card 
information or bank login details.  
IP Address hijacking IP space hijacking is not a new phenomenon and has been a recurring issue 
over the years. Spammers can hijack spaces that have not yet been allocated 
(still in IANA pool) or they can use free/reserved space from an RIR pool. 
Unallocated spaces not registered in an RIR database and being advertised 
in the global routing are referred as bogon space [5]. Some spam filters will 
use Bogons database to fight spam but it is not always very efficient. The 
problem is that sometimes mail headers legitimately contain Bogon IPs for 
example, in case internal mail servers use public IPs in a private fashion. 
 
The history of the Internet is full of cases of IP hijacking, one very well 
known in the RIR community is the Pakistan Telecom-YouTube hijack [6]. 
Although the objective was not to do spamming but to rather blackhole 
traffic, the principle used was the same. The hijack was successful partly 
because of poor outbound BGP filtering but also because there were no hard 
security mechanisms deployed at a wide scale. Another aspect to consider is 
the fact that Internet routing is done “by rumour”, meaning that hijacked 
spaces can easily find their way on the global routing tables. 
4. Accurate Internet Number Resources Management 
Anti-spam techniques can broadly be classified in two categories: either Content-based [16] 
or Reputation-based [17]. Examples of Content-based techniques are heuristic filtering, 
fingerprint based filtering or machine learning techniques. On the other hand, Reputation-
based approaches would rather focus on parameters such as email origin, traffic flow and 
volume [18]. Depending on which side an email administrator is (End-user, sender or server 
side), different spam mitigation techniques apply. 
It is important to understand that as a registry, an RIR has the obligatory duty to 
maintain an up-to-date database of information. As per the ICP-2 document on the criteria 
for the establishment of new RIRs from ICANN, RIRs must keep proper records of all 
registry activities [7]. As such, RIRs do not specifically operate any anti-spam mechanism 
but maintains a set of frameworks (either technical or policy based) that can be used as 
mitigating factors. Those are for example the Abuse Contact Information policy [8], the 
Reverse DNS service and related policies, the Internet Routing Registry (IRR) [10] and the 
Resource Certification framework (RPKI) [11]. 
4.1 Importance of the WHOIS Database 
RIRs maintain a public database of Internet number allocation (Provider ‘Aggregatable’) 
and end-user assignments (Provider Independent) spaces. Local Internet Registries, for e.g. 
Internet Service Providers (ISP), also need to declare their sub-allocation and customer 
assignments in their respective RIR’s WHOIS database. Besides Internet Numbers, which 
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consist of IPv4, IPv6 and Autonomous Systems (AS) numbers, the WHOIS database holds 
many other data objects required for the operations of a network. Below are a list of the 
main objects from the AFRINIC WHOIS database. 
Table 2: List of WHOIS Objects 
Object Description 
inetnum Object contains information on allocations and assignments of 
IPv4 address space. 
inet6num Object contains information on allocations and assignments of 
IPv4 address space. 
aut-num A database representation of an Autonomous System (AS) 
domain Domain name as specified in RFC 1034 
mntner Objects in the AFRINIC Database may be protected using 
mntner (pronounced "maintainer") objects. 
irt An irt object is used to define a Computer Security Incident 
Response Team (CSIRT). 
organisation The organisation class provides information identifying an 
organisation such as a company, charity or university, that is a 
holder of a network resource whose data is stored in the whois 
database. 
Role The role class is similar to the person class. However, instead of 
describing a human being, it describes a role performed by one 
or more human beings. 
person Contains information about technical or administrative contact 
responsible for the object where it is referenced. 
As such, each object in the WHOIS database has a contact information in the form of 
either a PERSON object, a notify email address, a maintainer object and if the object is tied 
to an organisation, the “org” attribute. 
 
Fig 1: Example of an Autonomous System (AS) Number 
4.2 Importance of Registering Customer Assignments 
Spam filters are built on information received from different sources such as Spamhaus 
[23]. Sometimes when a host or several hosts on a network are found to be spamming, the 
network gets blacklisted. The WHOIS database is used to retrieve information on those 
subnets, which are usually customer assignments. However, if an LIR fails to register its 
customer assignments in the RIR's WHOIS database, the only next information available 
would be the LIR network itself. 
As a matter of best practice, it is therefore recommended for LIRs to register their end-
user assignments, the reason being if a host in a non-registered subnet (for e.g. a /28) is 
aut-num:        AS37708 
as-name:        AFRINIC-MAIN 
descr:          AFRINIC MAIN AS 
admin-c:        CA15-AFRINIC 
tech-c:         IT7-AFRINIC 
org:            ORG-AFNC1-AFRINIC 
mnt-by:         AFRINIC-HM-MNT 
mnt-lower:      AFRINIC-IT-MNT 
mnt-routes:     AFRINIC-IT-MNT 
mnt-irt:        IRT-AFRINIC-IT 
source:         AFRINIC 
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blocked because it is involved in spamming activities, the whole subnet of the parent (for 
e.g. a /19) can be denied access. 
It is therefore highly recommended for an ISP to register their customer assignments. In 
Africa, there was a policy proposal through the AFRINIC Policy Development Process to 
make the registration of customer assignments mandatory [30]. However, LIRs sometimes 
refrain from providing information on customer assignments, even though the address 
spaces are in use, as a matter of privacy. 
4.3 Importance of Registering Reverse DNS 
4.3.1 Reverse DNS Service 
RIRs manage reverse DNS for the IANA delegated zones which are the *.in-addr.arpa for 
IPv4 and *.ip6.arpa for IPv6. For example, if a member was assigned a 196.1.5.0/24 
network on which a mail server is running, the member needs to do the delegation of the 
5.1.196.in-addr.arpa zone from its RIR, who manages the parent 196.in-addr.arpa zone. 
Fig 2: Section 5 of RFC2050 
4.3.2 Importance of PTR Records 
As a matter of best practice, even though RFC1033 and RFC1912 specify that "Every 
Internet-reachable host should have a name", rDNS has never become a protocol 
requirement for the operation of the DNS. Therefore, rDNS has always been considered as 
optional, explaining why not every host on the Internet today is mappable to a domain 
name. However, this technique is widely used by email servers to fight spam. 
IP addresses assigned by an RIR are public IP address that will be used statically. Email 
operators that have used these static IPs need to properly configure the rDNS entries to 
make the match between the IP address and the domain name of the server. This also 
applies to home (dialup) users who are usually assigned dynamic IPs by their respective 
LIRs. Below are examples of PTR records to "whois.afrinic.net" domain name. 
Fig 2: Example of PTR Records 
4.3.3 rDNS Check by Mail Servers 
Reverse DNS (rDNS) is a mechanism used by mail servers to make the connection back the 
sender’s PTR record if it has one. When an email server sends an email to another server, 
the receiver will check whether the IP of the domain name in the SMTP Banner has a 
corresponding PTR record. The receiving server will use this IP to check that the sender has 
a reverse DNS entry [12]. 
The downfall is that is that not all email service administrators will configure rDNS for 
their server. Legitimate emails coming from those servers might get rejected if the receiver 
has activated rDNS check [13]. 
20.2.216.196.in-addr.arpa domain name pointer whois.afrinic.net. 
0.2.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.1.0.2.0.0.0.0.0.0.d.2.4.1.0.0.2.ip6.arp
a domain name pointer whois.afrinic.net. 
IN-ADDR.ARPA Maintenance 
 
The regional registries will be responsible for maintaining IN-ADDR.ARPA records only on the parent 
blocks of IP addresses issued directly to the ISPs or those CIDR blocks of less than /16. Local IRs/ISPs 
with a prefix length of /16 or shorter will be responsible for maintaining all IN-ADDR.ARPA resource 
records for its customers. IN-ADDR.ARPA resource records for networks not associated with a specific 
provider will continue to be maintained by the regional registry. 
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4.4 Implementation of an Abuse Contact Policy (Case Study of AFRINIC) 
Some RIRs, namely AFRINIC and the RIPE NCC have implemented an Abuse Contact 
Information policy. The policy stipulates that there must be a dedicated object in the 
WHOIS database to cater for abuse contact information. 
Network owners increasingly operate dedicated abuse handling departments, distinct 
from the basic operations department. More and more network owners and other 
institutions are also starting to exchange data about abusive behaviour with each other, to 
more quickly allow networks to identify internal abuse, external abuse, and other security 
problems. Earlier, the abuse reports were sent to e-mail address specified in the e-mail field. 
These addresses were used because the RIR WHOIS Database currently did not have any 
specialised contact object for abuse departments. Instead, all abuse reports were sent to 
contacts that usually have broader responsibilities or different responsibilities. 
If an IP address is found to be spamming, abuse reports are sent to e-mail address 
specified in the e-mail field of the object holding the prefix information. RIRs have 
therefore implemented a new object type called “irt” for Incidence Response Team. IRT 
objects provide information about a CSIRT (Computer Security Incident Response Team), 
which is basically a group of individuals responsible for handling network security 
incidents and reports for any given organization or entity. 
The issue however, is that the "mnt-irt" is not mandatory. For instance at AFRINIC, the 
policy does not force its members to register an IRT object in their inetnum, inet6num and 
aut-num objects. The table below shows the number of IRT objects per object type in the 
AFRINIC WHOIS database (August 2015): 
 
Abuse contact information 
(e.g. remarks: Please send abuse to 
abuse@example.com) 
 IRT object usage (e.g. mnt-irt: IRT-AFRINIC-IT) 
Object 
Type 
Total in 
database 
Number of objects
with any abuse  
information 
% 
over total 
in database 
 
Number of 
objects 
with mnt-irt 
attribute 
% 
over total 
in database 
IPv4 113111 12668 11.2  10 0.00 
IPv6 1057 120 11.3  1 0.09 
AS 
Number 1474 48 3.25  5 0.34 
Total 115642 12836 11  16 0.01
Table 3: Statistics on Abuse Contact Information on AFRINIC WHOIS Objects 
4.5 Resource Certification against Route Hijacking 
Route hijacking is a complex issue that has been the headache of network operators for a 
long time. As mentioned earlier, routing on the Internet today is based on trust and mutual 
relationships between BGP peers. So far there has not been any largely accepted 
mechanism that uses hard security principles like digital signatures in order to make routing 
on the Internet more robust. RPKI (Resource Public key Infrastructure), together with 
BGPSEC [27] (still under development), are the frameworks being currently investigated as 
a global solution to secure the Internet Routing. 
Internet Routing Registries (IRR) can also be used to mitigate the risk of route 
hijacking, though not really considered as a sustainable solution. There are around 30 
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Routing registries in the world [28], some of them operated by RIRs, others by private 
entities. Network operators can publish their routing policies online allowing other BGP 
speakers to create filters based on those policies. Currently, there is no way to validate the 
information on IRRs making the system a bit brittle. That is why eyeballs are currently on 
the RPKI framework as the next big step in routing security. 
Resource Certification [11] is a security framework with makes use of a Public Key 
Infrastructure to certify resources that have been assigned to a member, through the 
delivery of a Resource Certificate. It adds a verifiable form of resource holdership. A 
Resource Certificate is based on the X.509 certificate format (RFC 5280), extended by 
RFC3779 to include Internet number resources (IPv4, IPv6 and AS number). 
Fig 3: Example of an RPKI Certificate with Internet Resources 
With a Resource Certificate, network operators can create cryptographic objects called 
Route Origin Authorization (ROA), which are signed by the certificate to bind a prefix to 
an Origin AS. ROAs become therefore the mechanism “par excellence” to prevent route 
hijacking as only prefix owners can verifiably say which AS is allowed to advertise its 
network. 
Certificate: 
    Data: 
        Version: 3 (0x2) 
        Serial Number: 2 (0x2) 
    Signature Algorithm: 
sha256WithRSAEncryption       
Issuer: 
CN=AFRINIC/serialNumber=90A020F44F15B89D6FB15B5060D21067E43C0C0B 
        Validity 
            Not Before: May 15 06:59:27 2015GMT 
            Not After : Mar 31 00:00:00 2016GMT 
Subject: 
CN=F365CA10AF/serialNumber=B883D77155F7D67BA69663FE59AB8FCE04300394 
... 
... 
        sbgp-ipAddrBlock:critical 
                IPv4: 
                  196.1.0.0/24 
                IPv6: 
/
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Fig 4: Example of a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) Object 
Relying party BGP speakers that are RPKI enabled, will create filters based on data 
received from RPKI Cache validator [15]. Then the router will tag every route 
announcement in its RIB as valid, unknown or invalid. An announcement is: 
 Valid when it is covered by at least one ROA. (i.e AS in ROA matches Originating AS 
and prefix in ROA covers prefix announced) 
 Unknown when no covering ROA has been found for the announcement. 
 Invalid when a ROA covers the prefix announcement but the Originating AS does not 
match AS in ROA. 
Below are some statistics about RPKI globally: 
RIR 
Total no. of 
route 
announcements Valid Invalid Unknown Accuracy 
RPKI 
Adoption 
Rate 
AFRINIC 15370 (100%) 237 (1.54%) 5 (0.03%) 15128 (98.43%) 97.93% 1.57% 
APNIC 156613 (100%) 3138 (2%) 1168 (0.75%) 152307 (97.25%) 72.88% 2.75% 
ARIN 219008 (100%) 1785 (0.82%) 341 (0.16%) 216882 (99.03%) 83.96% 0.97% 
LACNIC 76962 (100%) 14235 (18.5%) 673 (0.87%) 62054 (80.63%) 95.49% 19.37% 
RIPE NCC 158548 (100%) 16550 (10.44%) 1168 (0.74%) 140830 (88.82%) 93.41% 11.18% 
Table 4: RPKI Deployment in the AFRINIC Region 
Furthermore, Spamhaus [29] maintains an "Extented/Don't Route Or Peer Lists" aka 
EDROP and DROP lists [23]. Those lists are advisory list of "hijacked networks" and being 
used by spammers or other cyber criminal to do illicit operations. These lists are mainly 
used by firewalls and routing equipments to drop traffic. 
We used to EDROP list [24] to extract the number of subnets (/24) that are from 
AFRINIC region. 
version: 0 
as_id: 37301 
prefixes: 
  146.64.10.0/24-24 
signing certificate: 
  serial:   7 (0x7) 
  not before:   2015-06-11T08:42:09 
  not after:    2015-06-26T08:42:09 
  subject:  CN=557949f1-a786 
  ski:      2e4427450ad7ecf6ad6b3b257a29b6547adb79c2 
  g_ski:    LkQnRQrX7Patazsleim2VHrbecI 
  sia: 
    signedObject:   
rsync://rpki.afrinic.net/repository/member_repository/F3634D22/24294C
20FADD11E49BBA825D3BB695CA/CA8EB9AE101511E5B100220DD949923A.roa 
  issuer:   CN=F3634D22AR, 
SN=FAFEBCF83FC94DF547DDAE1DF56495BDBCD2C192 
  aki:      fafebcf83fc94df547ddae1df56495bdbcd2c192 
  g_aki:    -v68-D_JTfVH3a4d9WSVvbzSwZI 
 Copyright © 2016 The authors http://www.ist-africa.org/Conference2016 Page 9 of 11 
RIR 
# of subnets 
in EDROP  
list (/24) 
% Referenced IRT objects 
Subnets (/24) 
Covered  
by ROA 
AFRINIC 94 3.5 0 None 
APNIC 2486 92.5 - None 
ARIN 14 0.5 - None 
LACNIC 3 0.1 - 1 
RIPE 100 3.7 - 2 
Total 2697    
Table 5: Statistics from Spamhaus 
The table above shows that 3.5% of hijacked space (in the EDROP list) is from AFRINIC. 
None of the space tagged as "hijacked" by Spamhaus have an IRT object referenced and 
none are covered by ROAs. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper gave an overview of the how RIRs contribute to the fight against spam globally. 
As mentioned, spam is a multidimensional problem that cannot be tackled from one 
perspective only. The policy measures and technical frameworks made available to the 
Internet community are only part of a global endeavour to combat spam. Many international 
institutions are also involved in this battle like the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
[20], the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) [21] and the Internet Society 
(ISOC) [22]. 
ISPs and network service providers need to correctly document their networks and 
publish their information in the WHOIS Database. RIR members must be made aware of 
the purpose of the data that is stored in the WHOIS database and the importance of its 
accuracy. Often when large blocks of IPs are blacklisted this is as a result of a failure to 
resolve the network abuse with the designated owner of the IP block. Network operators 
need to be made aware of their responsibilities for managing abuse of their networks by 
spammers (and other abusers). The consequences of failing to manage abuse of their 
networks can include blacklisting of their own and others networks and they should take 
responsibility for when they negatively affect users. 
Apart from policy measures, RIRs maintain and manage different technical frameworks 
that are the Reverse DNS service, the Internet Routing Registry (IRR) and the Resource 
Certification (RPKI) system. While those frameworks should not be considered as the 
"ultimate anti-spam solutions", they must be viewed as mitigating measures. Altogether, 
those frameworks help build a more robust Internet infrastructure and therefore contributed 
to reduce the attack surface of spammers. 
Some of the statistics available on usage shows that the systems in place are mostly 
under-utilised. Much effort has to be gathered to encourage members register their end-user 
assignments and create the corresponding abuse contact information objects, keep their 
objects up-to-date, register and sign their reverse DNS and to prevent prefix hijacking, start 
making use of the IRR and RPKI systems. 
 Copyright © 2016 The authors http://www.ist-africa.org/Conference2016 Page 10 of 11 
References 
[1] Anon, (2016). [online] Available at: 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-
state_of_spam_and_phishing_report_09-2010.en-us.pdf [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[2] J. Rosenberg, C. Jennings, Cisco, RFC5039, The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Spam, January 
2008. 
[3] Z. Zorz, Help Net Security, [online] Available at: http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=8599, 
[Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[4]Federal Bureau of Investigation, Common Fraud Schemes, [online] Available at: 
https://www.fbi.gov/scams-safety/fraud [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[5] N. Feamster, J. Jung, H. Balakrishnan, MIT Computer Science and AI Laboratory, An Empirical Study 
of “Bogon” Route Advertisements, January 2005. 
[6] M. Brown, Dyn Research, Pakistan hijacks YouTube, [online] Available at: 
http://research.dyn.com/2008/02/pakistan-hijacks-youtube-1/, [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[7] ICANN, Criteria for Establishment of New Regional Internet Registries, June 2001. [online]
 Available at: 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/new-rirs-criteria-2012-02-25-en, [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[8] T. Knecht, AFRINIC Abuse contact Information Policy, May 2012. [online] Available at 
https://afrinic.net/en/library/policies/698-afpub-2010-gen-006, [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[10] A. Toonk, How Accurate are the Internet Routing Registries, March 2009, [online] Available at 
http://www.bgpmon.net/how-accurate-are-the-internet-route-registries-irr/ [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[11] M. Lepinski, S.Kent, IETF RFC6480, An Infrastructure to support Secure Internet Routing, February 
2012. 
[12] P. Srikanthan, CS Department, George Mason University, An overview of Spam Handling Techniques, 
2003 
[13] Spamhaus, Why should I worry about reverse DNS(rDNS), [online] Available at: 
http://www.spamhaus.org/faq/section/ISP%2520Spam%2520Issues#128, , [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[15] R. Bush, R. Austein, IEFT RFC6810, The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router 
Protocol, January 2013 
[16] W. Bin, P Wen-feng, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, A survey of 
Content-based Anti-spam Email Filtering, May 2005 
[17] A. Ramachandran, N. Feamster, S. Vempala, Georgia Tech, ACM CCS 07, Filtering spam with 
behavioural blacklisting, 2007 
[18] H.S. Alkahtani, P. Gardner-Stephen, R. Goodwin, King Faisal University, Saudi Arabia, Flinders 
University, Australia. A Taxonomy of Email Spam Filters, 2011 
[19] Anon, (2016). [online]  Open mail relay, WIKIPEDIA, Available at: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_mail_relay, [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[20] G. Lindberg, Chalmers University of Technology, IETF RFC2505, Anti-Spam Recommendations for 
SMTP MTAs, February 1999. 
[21] Anon, (2016). [online] Available at: http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Cybersecurity/Pages/SPAM.aspx [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[22] The Internet Society, Combating Spam Project, [online] Available at: 
http://www.internetsociety.org/combating-spam-project, [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[23] Spamhaus Don’t Route or Peer Lists, [online] Available at: http://www.spamhaus.org/drop/ [Accessed 
8 Jan. 2016]. 
[24] Spamhaus EDROP List, The Spamhaus Project. [online] Available at: 
http://www.spamhaus.org/drop/edrop.txt [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[25] Messaging Malware Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group (M3AAWG). (online) Available at: 
https://www.m3aawg.org/ [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[27] S. Bellovin, R. Bush, IETF RFC7353, Security Requirements for BGP Path Validation, August 2014. 
[28] Merit, List of Routing registries, [online] Available at: http://www.irr.net/docs/list.html [Accessed 
8 Jan. 2016]. 
[29] The Spamhaus Project, [online] Available at: http://www.spamhaus.org/ [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[30] J.R. Houtomey, AFRINIC Policy, Mandatory requirements for registering assignments and sub-
allocations, September 2014. [online] Available at: 
http://afrinic.net/fr/library/policies/archive/withdrawn-proposals/1215-mandatory-requirements-for-
registering-assignments-and-sub-allocations [Accessed 8 Jan. 2016]. 
[31] Schwartz, Alan, Simson Garfinkel, and Debby Russell. Stopping spam. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., 
1998. 
[32] Lyman, Jay. "Spam costs $20 billion each year in lost productivity." E-Commerce Times 29 (2003). 
 Copyright © 2016 The authors http://www.ist-africa.org/Conference2016 Page 11 of 11 
[33] Beverly, R. and Sollins, K., 2008. Exploiting transport-level characteristics of spam. 
[34] Karrenberg, D., Gerard Ross, A.P.N.I.C., Paul Wilson, A.P.N.I.C. and Nobile, L., Regional Internet 
Registry. 
